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Introduction. 
 
Though it is widely claimed that the introduction of information technologies has 
transformed the nature of employment in the modern era, understanding of how 
computers have been affecting the lives of workers is far from comprehensive. In this 
paper we present some new evidence about the growth of computer usage at work. 
We also investigate the link between computer skills and pay in Britain, which is one 
of several contentious issues among social scientists attempting to understand the 
growth of economic inequality. 
The last ten years has witnessed a major expansion in the use of ICT in organisations. 
Investment in computer software reached 2% of GDP in 2002 after a 5-year period of 
rapid growth (Abramovsky and Griffith, 2007) and an accelerated expansion of 
overall ICT investment from £13 billion in 1992 to more than £35 billion in 2000 
(National Statistics, 2007). Even so, the spread of ICT among the UK population was 
far from complete by 2005, with one in four 16-74 year olds professing not even basic 
computing skills, according to official European Union data; digital access remains 
differentiated along lines of age and education (Demunter, 2005, 2006).  
Recent evidence has shown that the impact of ICT investment on UK productivity is 
substantial, and that ICT played the dominant role in explaining productivity growth 
in the 1990s (Crespi et al., 2007; Oulton and Srinivasan, 2005). In the US, the 
productivity boom since the mid-1990s is strongly linked to ICT investment (Draca et 
al. 2006)). Studies also find that the effects of new ICT projects are especially high in 
the long-term, because of their complementarity with investments in organisational 
change (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).  With these impacts from such a pervasive and 
fast-growing new technology, it would seem quite plausible that the required skills 
should, for a time at least, be scarce, given that access to acquiring the skills is 
constrained and costly. If the labour market value of the skills is high enough, it is 
possible to see how the technology becomes part of the process through which income 
gaps are widened and the low-skilled excluded from rising affluence as a consequence 
of the “digital divide”. The rising demand for computer skills contributes to the 
increased demand for highly qualified workers; and, beyond schooling, if access to 
acquiring computing skills is adversely distributed (whether by institutional 
constraints, age, or ability) then the technology becomes a route towards inequality. It 
is in part for these reasons that computer skills training has been embedded in the 
school curriculum, and in the life-long learning agenda, and is now a major focus for 
European Union initiatives. The question for policy-makers, however, is whether the 
training is adequate, and one way of examining this issue is by looking at the impact 
computers are having on the labour market. 
It has long been recognised that computer usage, even at quite simple levels, is 
associated with higher pay. Raw calculations show that, in 2006, on average computer 
users (for the moment undifferentiated, see below) earned 63% more than non-
computer users. But much of this gap is evidently associated with other characteristics 
– chiefly, prior education – rather than computer skills as such. It is important to try to 
discover how much (if at all) computing skills have a causal effect on pay, once other 
factors have been isolated and controlled for. A “large” impact calls for renewed 
efforts to support computer skills training, for both egalitarian and efficiency reasons. 
If the impact is low or non-existent, policy-makers had best look to other factors 
behind rising inequality, such as inadequate general education or reduced protection 
for low-paid workers. Yet labour economists have so far failed to come up with a 
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consensual assessment of the computer’s effect. While Krueger (1993), in a seminal 
paper on the 1980s US labour market, proposed that a pay premium of between 10 
and 15% for computer use could explain a substantial part of the rising return to 
schooling – and while others have confirmed the pay premium in the US and 
elsewhere – an influential opposing group have held that the computing pay premium 
is merely a reflection of unobserved ability which would have led computer-users to 
receive higher pay anyway, even absent the technology. Put another way, the critique 
is that the computer revolution affected those workers who were already being paid 
more by virtue of their occupational or industrial status or of some latent but enduring 
individual quality. 
Reconfirmation and extension of Krueger’s US evidence has come from a number of 
studies which range over methods, time and place. Methods vary according to the 
extent to which they are able to control for the many other characteristics of jobs that 
could affect both pay and the likelihood of using computers. Three approaches can be 
used. One can include a large number of job characteristics in an attempt to control 
for observed heterogeneity. However, this approach is rare, owing to lack of data. One 
can, alternatively, use instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of 
computer usage. Finally, some studies use limited panel data to try to eliminate 
potential biases attributable to unobserved but fixed heterogeneous characteristics. In 
the US Goss and Phillips (2002) find support for a substantial computer skills 
premium, but their data do not allow extensive controls for either personal or job 
characteristics. Dunne et al (2004) find an impact at firm level from investment in 
computers on wages. There is confirmation also in Canada (Pabilonia and Zoghi, 
2005) where controls for fixed effects reduce the estimated computer pay premium for 
current computer usage to an insignificant amount, but still leave a substantial 
premium (13%) for computer-users that have had average prior experience with 
computers. For Australia, Borland et al. (2004) find a substantial premium, but the 
earnings effect is found to be specified better by the number and level of computer 
skills than by a simple computer-use dummy variable. Studies in some developing 
countries are also supportive (e.g. Ng(2006) for Shanghai, Liu et al (2004) for 
Taiwan). 
In Britain, several studies find that there is a substantive pay premium for computer 
users. Arabsheibani et al (2004) using 1980s data from the British Social Attitudes 
Survey, found large returns (22% to 26%), rising to a surprising 37% when seemingly 
taking account of selection. Arabsheibani and Marin (2006), however, using the 5th 
sweep of the National Child Development Study (NCDS) in 1991, report lower 
estimates ranging from 7 to 17%. Both these studies use rather old data, which throw 
little light on recent changes since computers have become pervasive in British jobs 
(see below), and the authors appear unaware of the existence of more recent data and 
studies. More pertinent to recent developments is the analysis of Dolton and 
Makepeace (2004), which makes use of both the 5th (1991) and 6th (2000) waves of 
the NCDS; they find that during the 1990s there was a computer use premium for 
women of between 10% and 12%, and for men of between 9% and 13%. Hildreth 
(2001) finds that email usage carries with it a premium in 1998, though suggests that 
much of the premium may be associated with unobserved complementary skills which 
only some managers choose to use. Finally, Green (1998) and Dickerson and Green 
(2004), using data from the 1997 and 2001 Skills Surveys, find substantial effects 
from using computers at different levels. A distinctive finding of the latter studies, 
which include controls for a large number of job-related variables and use pseudo-
 3
panel techniques, is that more sophisticated computer usage brings higher returns, as 
one might expect. In 2001 the premium ranged from 8% to 21% depending on the 
level of computer use.  
Set against these confirmatory studies implying a substantial premium are those 
which claim to show that the premium for computer skills is zero. Frequently cited is 
the somewhat derisive study by Dinardo and Pischke (1997) which reasoned against 
Krueger’s findings as follows. Using early German data they find that using pencils 
(or other simple and widely used tools) is associated with a pay differential similar to 
that for computer use; and, since it is implausible to infer that the skill to use pencils 
causes pay to rise by, say, 13% (they ascribe the appearance of this gap to unobserved 
skills), they prefer to believe the same must be true of computers. Unfortunately for 
this analysis, however, the list of job characteristics is quite attenuated, so they were 
unable to investigate whether a more comprehensive data set on jobs would have 
allowed them to eliminate the pencils premium but not the computer premium (see 
Dickerson and Green, 2004, who show precisely this effect in Britain). We therefore 
consider the “pencils” critique to be unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, the point remains 
that exclusion of complementary skills from analyses is a pervasive potential source 
of bias, usually over-estimation, in the coefficients attached to individual skills which, 
if ignored, can lead to false inferences about the role of computers in generating 
inequality. Handel (2007) shows that, after including measures of seven detailed job 
tasks and pre-computing-revolution occupational and industry mean wages in his 
regressions, the impact of using a pc or terminal in the US in 1991 is very much 
reduced and in one specification rendered altogether insignificant. An alternative 
approach is to try to measure computer skills directly. Direct assessment data on 
computer skills are not currently available for this purpose. Borghans and ter Weel 
(2004) use some indirect, self-assessment measures of skill available in the 1997 
Skills Survey (Ashton et al, 1999), and find that the self-assessment measure of 
computer skill is not related to pay once computer use is controlled for; however, they 
do not consider the downward bias resulting from the probable considerable 
measurement error related to self-assessment.  
Of some interest are panel studies which with conventional estimators claim to 
eliminate the biases associated with unobserved personal or job characteristics. 
Entorff and Kramarz (1997) find, using French data, that fixed effects estimates show 
much smaller and statistically insignificant pay premia associated with immediate 
take-up of computers, but report that there is a return of approximately 1% per year of 
experience using computers. At that rate, it would not take long for the impact of 
computers to be noticeable. Kuku et al. (2007), also using panel data, come to the 
conclusion that there is no pay premium in Russia. Also claiming to eliminate fixed-
effects bias, a twins-based study in the US (Krashinsky, 2004) finds a statistically 
insignificant pay premium of 7%. There are, however, reasons to be cautious about 
the preference for conventional panel fixed-effects estimates. First, the panel 
estimates generally rely on relatively crude dynamic assumptions, often assuming that 
computers’ boost to wages (if it exists) should be instantaneous. However, it seems 
much more plausible to assume that computing skills take time to acquire, and Entorff 
and Kramarz’s finding confirms this. Second, the studies are compounded by the 
danger of large measurement errors. In the Entorff and Kramarz panel, for example, 
the date at which computers started to be used is imputed by use of an untested recall 
question in the third year of the panel. In Krashinsky’s twins sample the problem is 
confounded by a small sample size (381 twin pairs, with an unreported number of 
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cases of between-twin differences in computer usage). The standard errors are 
unsurprisingly high, making it easy to accept a null hypothesis that computers have no 
effect. If, however, the null hypothesis were that the effect is much higher (e.g. the 
10% of Krueger’s study – why not?) this also could not be rejected, even though the 
author reports that the impact of computers “disappeared” (Krashinsky, 2004: 88). 
Third, Dolton and Makepeace (2004) find that conventional panel fixed-effect 
estimators can be flawed by assuming that the impact of computers is homogeneous 
across groups of computer-users and across time. They found different premia among 
male computer-users according to when they started using computers. Fourth, fixed-
effects estimators can be downward biased if wages are downwardly rigid, or if 
computer-users are still indirectly paying the cost of acquiring computer skills at 
around the time that their use of computers is being measured. For these reasons, 
panel estimates should not necessarily be preferred, in this case, over cross-section 
estimates that can include a wide range of job characteristics or can otherwise 
satisfactorily allow for the endogeneity of computer usage.  
We have described, so far, what studies have shown about the impact of computers on 
pay, and found a conflicting story, where estimates range from near zero to very 
substantial and the implausibly large. The variation across time and place is relevant 
because there is no reason to expect universally valid findings. Thus, even if Entorff 
and Kramarz’s findings are accepted in full, there is little reason to expect that the 
valuation of computer skills in France during the 1980s can be a satisfactory basis for 
analysing the altogether different British labour market twenty years later. The 
findings in Britain generally indicate that there has been a positive pay premium, yet 
neither is its magnitude established (which pertains to the issue of whether computers 
have directly affected the pay distribution), nor whether there is a tendency for 
computer skills premia to decline as the supply becomes more widespread. Much of 
the literature in all countries has been handicapped by poor data, in which employees 
are recorded to be either computer users or non-users, with no measures of the 
intensity or level of usage (and hence of the required skills) and usually few or no 
other generic skills measured. Occasionally, researchers have resorted to self-
assessment of skills (Borland et al. (2004) and Liu (2004)), which can easily be 
compounded by personality traits.  
Finally, the conclusion that ICT’s impact on productivity is complementary with 
investments in organisational change (e.g. Crespi et al., 2006) is not reflected so far in 
this literature on computers and pay, with the exception of the study by Entorff and 
Kramarz (1997). Their finding of a premium for computer experience applies only to 
computer users with a high workplace autonomy. In the France of the 1980s, it seems 
that to convert ICT investments into productivity and hence wage increases, one had 
to be in a relatively skilled job, at least in terms of the level of autonomy offered to 
workers (which is typically taken as an index of skill). There is reason to expect such 
a connection, in that higher-level skills at managerial and professional levels will be 
associated with being able to bring about organisational change to generate efficient 
usages of ICT investments. Organisational changes, we know, have tended to be both 
skill-biased and effort biased (Caroli and van Reenen, 2002; Green 2004); and ICT 
investments interact in their impact on productivity with the proportion of graduates at 
industry level (Bloom et al. 2005). One might also expect the computer skill premium 
to be complementary with other skills associated with the ability to bring about 
organisational change.  
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The literature therefore leaves unsettled a number of issues about the potential role of 
computers in determining pay in Britain’s labour market. This paper will address the 
questions:  
i) As investment in information technologies has proceeded apace, what have been the 
changes in the prevalence of computer-users, and to the level and intensity of compute 
usage? Which groups have been gearing up the most to using computers at work?  
ii) What are the best estimates of how much computer skills are affecting pay in 
Britain in recent years, and how is the premium changing over time as competence 
with IT gradually spreads across the population? Are computing skills becoming like 
driving skills: imperfect but ubiquitous, with little additional scarcity value in the 
labour market?  
iii) Is there any evidence that computer skills are complementary with other scarce 
generic skills, especially those that might be expected to be associated with the ability 
to bring about efficient organisational change? 
 
2. Data. 
Consistent historical and recent data on the deployment of computer skills at work are 
available from a series from the series of individual surveys that runs from the Social 
Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) in 1986, through the Employment in 
Britain of 1992, and then the 1997, 2001 and 2006 Skills Surveys. The 1997 Skills 
Survey was designed in part to deliver some detailed knowledge about the importance 
of a wide range of activities carried out at work. These data were collected by 
adapting the methods of job analysis for the purposes of social survey. The outcome 
of this approach was that it enabled the measurement of the usage of several  generic 
skills, including computing skills. The 2001 and 2006 Skills Surveys are partial 
repeats of the questionnaire used in 1997, and in particular provide a consistent series 
of data on computing and the other generic skills.   
These surveys targeted the population of 20 to 60 year-olds in employment (or, in the 
case of 2006, ages 20 to 65), using clustered random sampling methods. Achieved 
samples were all closely nationally representative as judged by comparison with 
Labour Force Survey benchmarks.1 In addition, the 2006 survey included over-
sampling surveys of Wales, Scotland and the East Midlands, and for the first time 
included a sample of people in employment in Northern Ireland. This paper focuses 
only on Britain, and in the trend analyses just on those aged 20 to 60. All analyses 
incorporate both a design weight that takes account of clustering, household size, and 
oversampling, and a non-response weight to take account of a slightly higher non-
response rate from males than from females. Data was collected using face-to-face 
interviews, conducted in people’s homes. Full details of methods can be obtained 
from Gallie et al. (1998), Ashton et al. (1999), and Felstead et al. (2002; 2007). 
The general principle which underpins the “job requirements” approach to skills 
analysis is the strategy of asking respondents consistent questions about the activities 
involved in their jobs. Indicators of these activities are then treated as measures of the 
skills being deployed. The utilisation of computer skills is measured in a number of 
ways. The simplest indicator is “Participation” which derives from the (binary) 
                                                 
1 Green et al. (2000) show that the sampling methods used in SCELI yielded a near-re representative 
sample for Britain, while the other four surveys were representative by design. 
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answers to the question “does your own job involve use of computerised or automated 
equipment?”. Though this indicator fails to capture the importance and level of 
sophistication with which computers are used, the data are available on a consistent 
basis back to 1986. A second indicator is derived from a question designed to 
elucidate whether and how far computing skills are central to the job: “how important 
is using a computer, 'PC', or other types of computerised equipment?”. We refer to 
this as the “centrality” of computer use. Answers were on a 5-point scale ranging 
from “not at all important/does not apply” to “essential”. A third indicator captures 
the level at which computers are used. Respondents are asked to place the way they 
use computers on one of four levels, ranging from “straightforward” to “advanced”, 
with examples being given to anchor each level. Fourth, respondents were also asked, 
from 2001 onwards, to report the centrality of internet usage. Fifth, respondents 
reported the proportion of employees in their workplace that used computers. 
The Skills Surveys also measure several other generic skills that are used in many 
different kinds of jobs, in a consistent way from 1997 through 2006. Exploratory 
factor analyses were used to guide reduction of over 40 items, each measured on a 5-
point importance scale, to 13 theoretically-based skills domain indicators. Rather than 
compute factor scores, items were grouped as suggested by the factor analysis, and 
additive indices were generated to create the variables measuring the utilisation of 
skill in each of the 13 domains (Felstead et al., 2007). In this paper we focus in 
particular on a skill domain --  “influence skills” -- that we believe is likely to be 
associated with the successful and effective introduction and deployment of ICT in 
workplaces. As argued in studies of ICT’s impact on productivity, the effect of ICT is 
likely to be greatest when combined with good work organisation. It follows that 
computing skills should be complementary with other generic skills. In particular, we 
hypothesise that this requires employees both to assess the potential benefits to be 
gained from successful ICT use and to be able to persuade and influence and educate 
others in the workplace. Influence skills in our data are derived from the items 
capturing the importance of: persuading or influencing others; instructing, training or 
teaching people; making speeches or presentations; writing long reports; analysing 
complex problems in depth; and planning the activities of others. These items have an 
acceptable Cronbach’s alpha statistic of 0.84. We standardise the resulting index, 
which we simply term Influence Skills2, so that the range is from 0 to 4, where 4 
would result if the response to all items was “essential”, 0 if all responses were “not at 
all important/does not apply”.. 
 
3. The growth and distribution of computing and influence skills in Britain. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the remarkable invasion of computers into the British 
workplace over the last 20 years. Taking first the simple measure of “participation”, 
the proportion of employees using computers by this definition has nearly doubled 
since 1986, and appears to be heading towards a plateau of not much more than three 
quarters of the employee workforce. Over the same period there was a similar 
growing proportion of computer-intensive workplaces where at least half the 
employees are reported to be using computers or automated equipment. 
                                                 
2 We use title case when we wish to refer specifically to the index, and lower case when we refer to the 
underlying concept of influence skills. 
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The mere use of a computer, however, is a very loose indication of the skills being 
deployed, since computers can vary greatly in their importance for the job and in the 
level at which they are used. Figure 1 also plots the “centrality” of computer use to 
jobs. The proportion of those answering at the top of the scale (“essential”) rose from 
33% to 49% between 1997 and 2006. In addition to computers being “essential” for 
half of British employees, another quarter of employees rated them as “fairly 
important” or “very important” in 2006.  
Our figures for 2006 are close to estimates from other surveys. According to the 2004 
“Community Survey on ICT usage in households and by individuals”, 74% of 
employees use computers, internet or e-commerce (Demunter, 2005), which is 
comparable with our figure for participation. Moreover, the 2005 survey documents 
that 49% of employed persons were using computers “in their normal routine” 
(Demunter, 2006); this UK figure is close to the European Union average.3 Together, 
our two series for participation and centrality tell us that computers are being used in 
three out every four jobs in Britain, but are essential  in only two out of four jobs. 
The expanded computer use might have been expected to dilute usage, with 
progressively lower-level users adopting the technology at easier levels. The third 
series shows that this did not happen. The proportion of employees who use 
computers at a “high” level – either “complex” or “advanced” usage – rose from 16% 
to 23% over 1997 to 2006. Taken as a proportion of computer-users only, the increase 
was from 24% in 1997 to 28% in 2006. Examples of “complex” use were: using a 
computer for analysing information or design, including use of computer aided design 
or statistical analysis packages; an example of “advanced” use was using computer 
syntax and/or formulae for programming. Through this time, therefore, not only were 
more and more employees being joined up to the digital revolution, the preponderance 
were progressively being called on to exercise higher-level computing skills.  
Finally, Figure 1 also documents the very rapid expansion of internet usage at work. 
The proportion of jobs where internet usage was essential rose from 14% to 28% just 
in the short period from 2001 to 2006. 
Table 1 shows something of how computing skills are distributed among the 
population of employees in Britain. There are relatively small differences between 
men and women as regards the participation in computer use, though in the past 
participation used to be greater for women. Now, computing is regarded as “essential” 
in 48% and 51% of the jobs done by men and women respectively. There is a much 
larger difference, however, when it comes to the level of computer usage: the 
proportions using computers at “complex” or “advanced” levels is 28% for men, 
compared with 17% for women, a differential that has been maintained throughout the 
decade of rapid ICT expansion.4 Unsurprisingly, younger employees more recently 
out of school are more likely to have computer skills than older workers, though the 
differences in participation between young and old have narrowed in recent years. 
If computer skills affect labour market prospects, it is of some interest to see how 
those from different educational background vary in their use of computing skills. The 
differences are unsurprising but stark. In terms of participation, the figure for those 
with degrees is 71%, compared with just 20% for those holding no qualifications, a 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately the EU surveys are only of recent vintage and do not provide a historical perspective. 
4 There are especially sharp differences among women according to their status as part-time or full-
time workers (Felstead et al., 2007). 
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gap of 51 percentage points. The absolute differences seem to have been widening 
over the decade: back in 1997 the equivalent gap was only 40 percentage points.  
There is also a very large difference in 2006 between educational groups regarding 
the use of computers at “high” levels: 42% for graduates, compared for example with 
19% for those with just A level or equivalent. 
Table 1 also documents the changes and the distribution of influence skills. Between 
1997 and 2001 the Influence Skills index rose from 1.81 to 2.06, a rise of about one 
quarter of the 1997 standard deviation. This rise is statistically significant (p=0.000). 
An alternative way of describing this change (not shown in the table) is to compute 
the proportion of jobs for which Influence Skills is at least 3, (which is equivalent to 
the items being on average at least “very important” in the job). This proportion rose 
from 17% in 1997 to 23% in 2006. The increase is especially high among managers 
(34% to 44%), and among associate professional occupations (23% to 31%). Thus, 
influence skills, which we hypothesise to be complementary with the skills needed for 
the efficient deployment of ICT in workplaces, are rising, and not just because of the 
generally increasing prevalence of managers and professionals in workplaces. Finally, 
Table 1 also documents that influence skills are, unsurprisingly, very much more 
widely deployed in the jobs of the highly educated compared with those in lower 
educational groups; though note that influence skills are growing even in the lower 
educated groups. 
 
Figure 1 Computer Use 1986 to 2006
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“Participation” means use of computerised or automated equipment; “Workplace Computing 
Intensity” is % of workplaces where at least a half of employees use computers; “Centrality” 
is % of jobs where use of a pc or other type of computerised equipment is “essential” (5-pt 
scale “essential” to “not at all important/does not apply”); “High Level” is % of jobs where 
computers are used at “complex” or “advanced” levels (see text); “Internet Centrality” is % of 
jobs where internet use is “essential” (5-pt scale “essential” to “not at all important/does not 
apply”). 
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Table 1   Computing and Influence Skills, 1997-2006. 
 
 
“Centrality” of 
Computing* 
“Level” of 
Computing** 
Influence 
Skills*** 
All Employees 1997 33.1 16.1 1.815 
 2001 41.1 18.0 1.917 
 2006 49.3 22.6 2.062 
Men 1997 29.9 19.9 1.91 
 2001 40.0 22.4 2.005 
 2006 47.6 28.2 2.106 
Women 1997 36.7 11.8 1.71 
 2001 42.4 12.9 1.817 
 2006 51.1 16.8 2.017 
Age 20-40 1997 35.1 17.9 1.786 
 2001 44.2 21.5 1.942 
 2006 50.8 26.2 2.055 
Age 41-60 1997 30.4 13.6 1.856 
 2001 37.5 13.8 1.888 
 2006 47.6 18.7 2.071 
Education Level     
No qualifications 1997 13.5 2.5 1.19 
 2001 15.4 4.6 1.322 
 2006 20.0 3.8 1.412 
NVQ1 or equivalent 1997 22.0 8.5 1.523 
 2001 25.7 4.5 1.501 
 2006 30.9 10.7 1.546 
GCSE Grade C or equivalent 1997 34.8 10.2 1.643 
 2001 42.1 13.3 1.677 
 2006 47.4 13.5 1.807 
A level or equivalent 1997 38.3 19.9 1.879 
 2001 41.4 19.5 1.882 
 2006 42.9 18.7 1.998 
Professional or Vocational  1997 37.6 26.7 2.458 
Degree 2001 48.7 24.5 2.334 
 2006 61.6 31.0 2.475 
Batchelor’s Degree Level or  1997 53.3 38.4 2.585 
above. 2001 60.8 33.7 2.584 
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 2006 70.5 42.4 2.605 
Notes: 
Figures are for employees in England, Wales and Scotland, aged 20 to 60; excludes those 
working in private households or extra-territorial organisations. 
*Percentage reporting use of PC or other types of computerised equipment to be “essential” in 
their job. 
** Percentage reporting that they use computers at a “complex” or “advanced” level. 
Examples of “complex” use were: using a computer for analysing information or design, 
including use of computer aided design or statistical analysis packages; an example of 
“advanced” use was using computer syntax and/or formulae for programming. 
*** Index derived from six closely correlated items; see text. 
 
4. The return to computing and influence skills. 
Section 3 has documented that the last decade has been a period of rapid deployment 
of computer skills in workplaces, and has also noted a more modest but still 
significant increase in the deployment of influence skills. Moreover, the deployment 
of both types of skill has been found to be strongly positively related to education 
level. With such a profound change in workplaces, and there being obvious costs and 
constraints associated with the acquisition of these skills, it would not be surprising if 
bottlenecks occur and that the possession of computing skills (and possibly influence 
skills) acquire scarcity quasi-rents and/or permanent returns in the labour market.  
In this section, the aim is to investigate the effect that computer skills have on hourly 
pay, over and above the normal returns to the education that may have contributed to 
acquiring computing skills. We do this by estimating standard earnings equations 
including schooling and a quadratic term in work experience, and other conventional 
controls, and supplementing these with our measures of computing skills. We also 
aim to investigate whether, and if so how much, any impact of computing skills is 
effected through the simultaneous deployment of influence skills, as hypothesised 
above. We do this by interacting the Influence Skills index with our measures of 
computing skills. 
Tables 2 and 3 show our findings in respect of men and women based on the 2006 
Skills Survey data. We restrict the analysis to employees only. In each case column 
(1) is a benchmark earnings regression giving returns to schooling of approximately 
6% and 8% for males and females respectively. 
Column (2) introduces computing skills. For this purpose we have averaged the 
indices of computing centrality and of computing level to form a single index (termed 
simply “Computing Skills”5) that ranges from 0 to 4. Justification for this procedure is 
that the two constituent indices, though conceptually distinct, are closely correlated 
(ρ=0.78), and can each be seen as proxies for a latent variable measuring the 
computing skills needed to perform a job.6 A one-unit change in the Computing skills 
index amounts to 89% and 95% of the standard deviations within the male and female 
samples respectively. As can be seen, there is a substantial and significant return to 
Computer Skills, the estimated coefficient for the impact of Computer Skills on log 
pay being 0.146. This implies, for example, that a job requiring use of computer-aided 
design skills would pay 7.9% ( = 0.5 x 100 x e0.146-1) more than a job requiring the 
                                                 
5 Henceforth, we use title case when we wish to refer specifically to the index, and lower case when we 
refer to the underlying concept of computer skill. 
6 In practice, treating the indices separately did not lead to better-performing earnings functions. 
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use of word-processing or spreadsheet skills, assuming that computers were equally 
important in the two jobs, and that the job-holders had the same amount of education. 
It is quite possible, however, that this estimate is upward-biased through omission of 
other skills domains also not captured fully by the controls for education and work 
experience. One way to attempt to obtain an unbiased estimate is through 
instrumenting Computing Skills. We utilise for this purpose variables capturing 
whether there have been recent changes in the workplace. Four relevant variables are 
included, each as 0/1 dummies: whether in the last 5 years the workplace has 
introduced new computing equipment, whether it has introduced new communications 
technology equipment, whether it has introduced other new equipment, and whether 
the number of employees has been reduced. We maintain that it is plausible that these 
variables may affect whether computers are being used in a job, but that they would 
not necessarily have significant direct effects on pay. Both for men and for women, 
these instruments pass the Hansen J test which allows us to accept the hypothesis that 
the variables do not directly affect pay; the instruments also strongly identify the 
deployment of computing skills. For the purpose of the IV estimations, the samples 
are of necessity restricted to those employees who had been in the same job for the 
previous 5 years.7 As can be seen in column (3) of both tables, the estimated impact of 
computing skills is a little higher than the OLS estimate, in the case of males, and 
only marginally lower in the case of females.8 There is, therefore, some support for 
the view that computing skills are earning a true independent return in the labour 
market. 
In column (4) we investigate whether part of the impact of computing skills is 
complementary with influence skills which, as hypothesised, may improve the 
effective use of computers in jobs. We also include our indicator of the intensiveness 
of computer use in the workplace as a whole. The hypothesis here is that influence 
skills may interact both with individual computer use and with workplace computer 
intensity. Our estimates show that the effect of a unit increase in Computer Skills per 
se on log pay is much reduced though still significant (at 0.063 for men, 0.032 for 
women). Influence Skills on its own appears to have no significant association with 
pay. There is, however, a significant interactive effect from Computer Skills and 
Influence Skills for both men and women, supporting our hypothesis of 
complementarity. At the mean of Influence Skills, the additional interactive effect on 
log pay of a unit rise in Computing Skills is 0.021 for men and 0.042 for women. 
Moreover, influence skills are complementary also with workplace computing 
intensity: for both men and women, the Influence Skills index raises pay by an 
additional significant amount in high-computer-intensive workplaces (where at least 
three-quarters of employees are working with computers or automated equipment), 
but not in workplaces that are less intensive in computer use. A one point increase in 
Influence Skills9 yields an additional 10% pay premium for men, and 4% for women, 
in the high-computer-intensive workplaces. 
In column (5) we examine how far these estimates are robust to the inclusion of the 
twelve other generic skills indicators available in the Skills survey data. This exercise 
pursues further the possibility, already examined in one way through the IV estimates 
                                                 
7 If not in work 5 years previously, respondents reported about the last 4 years or, successively, 3 years. 
8 For direct comparability, the OLS estimates for the idential cample used in the IV estimates were 
0.144 (0.010) for males and 0.114 (0.010) for females. 
9 Equivalent to 98% and 96% of the standard deviation for men and for women respectively. 
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of column (3), that the estimates of computing skills are biased by the omission of 
other correlated skills which are rewarded in their own right and may have little to do 
with technology. As can be seen, inclusion of very many skills domains reduces the 
point estimate of most coefficients including that of computing skills on its own 
which becomes statistically insignificant. At the mean value of Influence Skills, the 
combined direct and interactive effect on pay of a one unit rise in computing skills is 
significant (p=0.000) and amounts to 5.3% for men and 6.0% for women. Moreover, 
for women there remains a substantive and significant interaction with Influence 
Skills. In the case of men, there is an additional significant interactive effect from 
Influence Skills in high-computer-intensive workplaces. 
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Table 2   
The Impact of Computing and Influence Skills on Hourly Pay of Men.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS IV OLS OLS 
Years of Education 0.061 0.044 0.038 0.035 0.030 
 (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Work Experience (yrs) 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.029 0.029 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
Work Experience Squared/100 -0.068 -0.059 -0.053 -0.045 -0.047 
 (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Computing Skills  0.146 0.187 0.063 0.026 
  (0.008)** (0.034)** (0.017)** (0.018) 
Influence Skills    0.011 0.032 
    (0.021) (0.025) 
(Computing Skills) times     0.018 0.013 
(Influence Skills)    (0.009)* (0.009) 
Proportion (pr) of workers 
using computers in 
establishment: 
     
¼ <= pr <= ¾    0.024 0.038 
    (0.043) (0.042) 
pr > ¾     -0.102 -0.096 
    (0.054)+ (0.051)+ 
(Influence Skills)    0.006 -0.000 
times (¼ <= pr <= ¾)    (0.025) (0.023) 
(Influence Skills)    0.094 0.084 
times (pr > ¾)    (0.029)** (0.027)** 
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 2641 2641 1534 2641 2641 
R-squared 0.31 0.42  0.47 0.51 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. Weighted regressions. The dependent variable is log hourly pay. All regressions 
contain standard controls for workplace size, part-time status, public/private sector, 
permanent/temporary contract status, whether male or female dominated occupation, industry 
and region. Column (4) includes also 12 further generic skills indicators including a measure 
of autonomy computed from the job requirements data (see Felstead et al., 2007).  
Column (3) is run for those who were in the same job either 3, 4 or 5 years previously. 
Instruments used for IV estimates: whether in last 5 years workplace has introduced new 
computing equipment, whether introduced new communications technology equipment, 
whether introduced other new equipment; and whether workplace has downsized. 
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic  to test for underidentification test: 
153.172, χ2(4) (P-value = 0.0000); Cragg-Donald F statistic for weak identification:  
39.220; Hansen J test statistic for overidentification of all instruments: 0.310,  χ2 (3) P-value 
=  0.9581. 
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Table 3  
The Impact of Computing and Influence Skills on Hourly Pay of Women.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS IV OLS OLS 
Years of Education 0.076 0.064 0.071 0.048 0.043 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Work Experience (yrs) 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.020 0.020 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Work Experience Squared /100 -0.046 -0.043 -0.044 -0.029 -0.030 
 (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Computing Skills  0.109 0.098 0.032 0.018 
  (0.008)** (0.035)** (0.014)* (0.015) 
Influence Skills    0.018 0.040 
    (0.018) (0.023)+ 
(Computing Skills) times     0.021 0.021 
(Influence Skills)    (0.008)* (0.008)* 
Proportion (pr) of workers 
using computers in 
establishment: 
     
¼ <= pr <= ¾    -0.006 0.003 
    (0.041) (0.040) 
pr > ¾     0.009 0.010 
    (0.042) (0.042) 
(Influence Skills)    0.021 0.018 
times (¼ <= pr <= ¾)    (0.023) (0.023) 
(Influence Skills)    0.041 0.038 
times (pr > ¾)    (0.024)+ (0.023) 
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 2852 2852 1652 2852 2852 
R-squared 0.41 0.47  0.54 0.56 
Notes: See Table 1. 
For column (3) Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic  to test for underidentification 
test: 141.106, χ2(4) (P-value = 0.0000); Cragg-Donald F statistic for weak identification:  
35.935; Hansen J test statistic for overidentification of all instruments: 2.004,  χ2 (3) P-value =  
0.5716. 
 
The next question we wished to investigate is whether the computing skills premium 
has been changing over time. A rising premium would be an indication of scarcity in 
the face of the rapidly rising deployment of computing skills documented in Section 
3. On the other hand, one might expect that as familiarity with computers spreads 
through the population the link with pay would be reduced. 
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of the returns to computing and influence on a  
consistent basis in each of the three Skills Survey years: 1997, 2001 and 2006. Each 
regression includes all available controls, including those of multiple other generic 
skills domains. 
Both tables show an increasing extent to which Computer Skills and Influence Skills 
interact to affect pay. While in 2006 the interaction is substantial and significant (as 
found in Tables 2 and 3) the estimated coefficient is smaller and insignificant in 2001, 
and in 1997 carries a small negative but insignificant estimate. In parallel, the 
estimates of the direct effects of Computer Skills and Influence Skills decrease over 
time. On average, the overall impact of Computer Skills on pay has increased over the 
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period. Evaluated at the mean level of Influence Skills for the whole decade the direct 
and interactive effect of a unit increase in Computing Skills on pay is estimated to 
have risen from 5.0% in 1997 to 7.2% in 2006 for men, and from 4.4% in 1997 to 
7.7% in 2006 for women. For those men and women in jobs with above average 
Influence Skills the Computer Skills premium rose faster than for those in jobs that 
use below-average Influence Skills. 
It thus transpires that the interaction between computing and influence skills is a very 
recent phenomenon. There is indeed some evidence that the rapid diffusion of ICT in 
British workplaces over the last decade is placing an increasing premium on those 
who have been able to acquire the skills to utilise the new technologies; but it is 
predominantly those jobs that deploy high levels of influence skills (where, we have 
reasoned, the technologies are likely to be used more effectively) that are now being 
rewarded with a scarcity premium for computing skills.  
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Table 4 Returns to Computing and Influence Skills Over Time for Men 
 
 1997 2001 2006 
Computing Skills 0.077 0.038 0.021 
 
 
(0.022)** (0.017)* (0.015) 
Influence Skills 0.129 0.121 0.077 
 
 
(0.030)** (0.027)** (0.022)** 
(Computing Skills) times (Influence 
Skills) 
-0.013 0.013 0.025 
 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007)** 
Observations 978 1811 2525 
R-squared 0.49 0.45 0.49 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. Weighted regressions; all years refer to population of GB aged 20-60.  
The dependent variable is log hourly pay. All regressions include schooling and a quadratic in 
work experience and contain standard controls for workplace size, part-time status, 
public/private sector, permanent/temporary contract status, whether male or female dominated 
occupation, industry, region and 10 further generic skills indicators including a measure of 
autonomy computed from the job requirements data (see Felstead et al., 2007). 
 
 
Table 5 Returns to Computing and Influence Skills Over Time for Women 
 
 1997 2001 2006 
Computing Skills 0.050 0.053 0.027 
 
 
(0.017)** (0.015)** (0.014)+ 
Influence Skills 0.125 0.119 0.085 
 
 
(0.025)** (0.021)** (0.022)** 
(Computing Skills) times (Influence 
Skills) 
-0.003 0.003 0.026 
 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)** 
Observations 967 1816 2770 
R-squared 0.60 0.50 0.53 
 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Our findings are consistent with the view that the diffusion of computing technology 
through the British economy is having notable effects on the labour market. There has 
been a remarkable rise in the proportions of jobs participating in the use of computers, 
to the extent that in 2006 three in four jobs entailed job-holders using computers, 
while for two in four jobs computer use was “essential”. At the same time, the level of 
computer use, far from being diluted by an influx of users facing only basic skills 
requirements, has risen. Computing skills requirements are, unsurprisingly, much 
higher for those with more education behind them. Moreover, there is no sign of any 
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narrowing in the computer skills gap, and indeed the gap appears to be widening. For 
example, the “centrality” of computing – the proportions for whom computers are 
essential – increased by 17 percentage points for those educated to degree level, but 
only by 6 percentage points for those with no qualifications. 
We have found that computing skills have a significant impact on pay but, in 2006, 
much of this effect is interactive with influence skills which we have argued to be 
complementary with computing skills in their effects on performance. Influence skills, 
which the data show cluster together in jobs, involve persuading or influencing others, 
instructing, training or teaching people, making speeches or presentations, writing 
long reports, analysing complex problems in depth, and planning the activities of 
others. Our best estimate of the average combined direct and interactive effect of a 
unit increase in the Computing Skills index (which ranges from 0 to 4) is that this 
raises pay, after allowing for many other skills and conventional controls, by 5.3% 
and 6.0% for men and women respectively. However, the effects are greater than that 
for those people in jobs with above average Influence Skills requirements. These 
estimates are arrived at after allowing for a large number of other generic skills and 
other conventional controls, which makes them more robust to the critique that they 
are overestimates because they might suffer from omitted skill bias. Our IV estimates 
also show only small differences from the OLS estimates.  
The combined effect of Computer Skills and Influence Skills has risen somewhat over 
the decade, indicating increased scarcity. It is notable, however, that in earlier years 
the impact of computing skills on pay was more direct and depended far less or not at 
all on the use of influence skills. It is only recently that the complementarity has 
become evident. A possible interpretation one might put upon this late manifestation 
of complementarity is that it is consistent with the view that there is a long and 
uncertain lag in the process through which managers and others learn how to deploy 
ICT technologies effectively, and that therefore the complementarity is only now 
beginning to emerge after a decade of high investment.  
The implied increased scarcity of computing skills, evident in our findings, provides 
general support for policies to broaden the stock of computing skills in the population; 
the findings also reinforce the need to ensure adequate supplies of people with what 
we have termed “influence skills”.  
The descriptive significance of our findings is that, since both computing skills And 
Influence Skills are scarce in jobs held by already disadvantaged groups (notably, 
low-education groups) the increasing importance of these skills may be exacerbating 
pay inequality in Britain. As can be observed from Tables 2 and 3, part of the return 
to education is tied up with the impact of the higher computing and influence skills 
associated with it – the estimated return coming down from .061 to .035 for men, and 
from .076 to .048 for women, once both Computing skills and Influence skills are 
allowed for. One can in principle utilise such observations in each survey year to 
derive some simple decompositions of the education premium, in order to calculate 
hypothetical counterfactual conjectures about what would have happened over the last 
decade to the skills premium, absent the rising importance of computers. In earlier 
years the effect on the schooling coefficient of including Computing and Influence 
skills is not greatly different from the effect in 2006 – suggesting that, despite the 
increasing premium on computing skills and its concentration in high education 
groups, any impact on the overall pay structure is small. However, since differential 
schooling is only part of the explanation for wage inequality, a thorough investigation 
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of the impact of computing on wage inequality would need to be more 
comprehensive, and has not been part of our objectives in this paper. Moreover, since 
rising wage inequality kicked off in the late 1970s, before the computer revolution 
become widespread in the workplace, it seems unlikely that computers could ever be 
more than a small part of the explanation. Nevertheless, the rising importance of 
computers, and the concentration on higher education groups which we have 
document here, implies that computing skills could, if these trends persist and the 
digital skills gap widens still further, play an increasing role in determining pay 
distribution in the coming years. 
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Annex:    Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Table A1  
Means of Dependent and Independent Variables in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 Males Females 
Log Hourly Pay 2.39 2.16 
Years of Education 12.98 12.93 
Work Experience (yrs) 23.82 23.68 
Work Experience/100 7.21 7.05 
Computing Skills 2.09 2.09 
Influence Skills 2.08 2.00 
Proportion (pr) of workers using computers in 
establishment:   
¼ <= pr <= ¾ 0.25 0.22 
pr > ¾ 0.51 0.56 
 
 
Table A2.  
Means of Dependent and Independent Variables in Table 4 and 5 
 Males Females 
 1997 2001 2006 1997 2001 2006 
Log Hourly Pay 1.97 2.18 2.39 1.71 1.93 2.17 
Computing Skills 1.78 2.06 2.18 1.72 1.98 2.14 
Influence Skills 1.93 2.00 2.10 1.71 1.81 2.02 
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